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INTRODUCTION
The Offenses Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the authority to “define and punish . . . Offences against the
Law of Nations.”1 This Note considers whether Congress must
conform to the jurisdictional rules of customary international law
when legislating pursuant to the Offenses Clause.
If a French citizen kidnaps a Russian—or even an American—in
Italy, she not only commits a crime under Italian law, but a crime
under customary international law, or the “law of nations.”2 Yet, if
the United States takes custody of the kidnapper, and prosecutes and
convicts her in federal court, a subsequent attempt by the United
States to impose punishment would be problematic under customary
international law. In the absence of a treaty,3 international law
generally does not permit kidnapping to be punished by nations
having no connection to the crime itself,4 or by nations whose only
1. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
2. Customary international law, or the “law of nations,” is the law regulating interactions
between nations, and, in some instances, between nations and individuals. For a fuller
discussion of the scope of customary international law, see infra Part I.A. Kidnapping is a
violation of customary international law. See Timothy D. Rudy, Did We Treaty Away Ker-
Frisbie?, 26 ST. MARY’S L.J. 791, 799-800 (1995).
3. Although treaties covering the problems presented herein exist, they are ignored for
the purposes of this Note. This Note is concerned only with the interaction between customary
international law and constitutional law in the absence of treaties.
4. There are, however, a few exceptions to this general rule. The United States can, for
example, assert jurisdiction over crimes threatening central U.S. interests, see infra notes 29-31
and accompanying text (discussing protective jurisdiction), and crimes so egregious as to merit
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connection is that the victim is of the same nationality.5 This Note
examines whether the assertion of federal jurisdiction over the
kidnapper might violate not only international law, but the U.S.
Constitution as well.
The Offenses Clause is unlike other constitutional clauses
because it refers to a body of law independent of federal or state law
and the American democratic process: the law of nations. This Note
concludes that this unique reference implies unique limitations. Since
the Offenses Clause incorporates principles of customary
international law into the Constitution, Congress must abide by those
principles when it relies on the Offenses Clause as the sole source of
authority for legislation.6
Congressmen and academics have invoked the Offenses Clause
with increasing frequency in the past few decades to support a series
of statutes that incorporate international law into domestic law.7
universal jurisdiction, see infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 42-46 (discussing passive personality jurisdiction).
6. In all other situations, international law is only controlling in the absence of other
authority. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is generally
presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on jurisdiction to
prescribe.”) (emphasis added); The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that
international law controls “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision”); United States v. Merkt, 794 F.2d 950, 964 n.16 (5th Cir. 1986) (stating
that Congress was not bound by international law in enacting a refugee statute); American
Baptist Churches v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756, 771 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (“Congress is not
constitutionally bound to abide by precepts of international law, and may therefore promulgate
valid legislation that conflicts with or preempts customary international law.”). But see United
States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 360 (5th Cir. 1979) (limiting federal jurisdiction over a
car theft case in Mexico because asserting jurisdiction would violate international law).
Though Congress is not bound by international law, one canon of statutory construction
requires courts to give unclear statutes a reasonable interpretation that is consonant with
international law. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any
other possible construction remains . . . .”). A separate but related canon of construction says
that “legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949).
7. The Offenses Clause was invoked as providing constitutional support for the
nationality-based jurisdictional provisions of the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, see S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 5 (1998); the War Crimes Act of 1996, see
H.R. REP. NO. 104-698, at 7 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2166, 2172; and the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, see S. REP. NO. 102-249, § III, at 5 (1991). For academic
references, see Robinson O. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing Offenses
Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509, 513 (1994) (“The nationality of an
alleged offender is apparently irrelevant under this constitutional grant of authority . . . .”);
Patrick L. Donnelly, Note, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction over Acts of Terrorism Committed
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Admittedly, all of these statutes could be grounded in treaties or
other constitutional provisions. The repeated invocation of the
Clause, however, raises questions as to whether it permits statutes
with provisions for extraterritorial jurisdiction exceeding that
permitted by customary international law. Academic honesty, as well
as the fact that Congress may enact legislation based solely on the
Offenses Clause, compels this examination.
To give some context to the question addressed in this Note,
Part I introduces the rudiments of customary international law and its
jurisdictional principles. Part II then employs history, text,
constitutional structure, and case law to show that customary
international law limits the Clause’s jurisdictional reach.
I. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ITS JURISDICTIONAL
PRINCIPLES
The law that the Offenses Clause invokes, once known as the
“law of nations,” is now more frequently called customary
international law.8 This part presents the basic principles of
customary international law and provides a brief overview of the
jurisdictional principles a nation might invoke to justify
extraterritorial prosecutions.9 It also discusses the interaction
between substantive and jurisdictional law and the constitutional
import of classifying jurisdictional principles as law instead of comity.
A. Customary International Law
International law regulates the relationships among nations, the
relationships between nations and the international community, and,
Abroad: Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
599, 609 (1987) (“The offenses clause thus extends jurisdiction beyond the limits allowed by
customary international law.”).
8. Although some legal academics and courts treat the two terms slightly differently, the
majority use “law of nations” and “customary international law” interchangeably. See, e.g.,
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) (treating the law of nations as
synonymous with customary international law); Craig H. Allen, Federalism in the Era of
International Standards: Federal and State Government Regulation of Merchant Vessels in the
United States (pt. 1), 29 J. MAR. L. & COM. 335, 380 (1998) (same); Kathryn Lee Boyd, The
Inconvenience of Victims: Abolishing Forum Non Conveniens in U.S. Human Rights Litigation,
39 VA. J. INT’L L. 41, 51 (1998) (same).
9. Extraterritorial jurisdiction refers to a nation prosecuting a crime that occurred outside
its physical borders.
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in some instances, between nations and individuals.10 There are two
sources of international law: treaties and customary international law.
Treaties are express agreements between nations. Although they are
the basis of most domestic laws regarding international law
violations, this Note does not address treaties or legislation passed
pursuant to the Treaty Clause.11 Customary international law, on the
other hand, is grounded in the implicit consent of all civilized
nations,12 and governs in the absence of a treaty.13 For something to
constitute a rule of customary international law it must be consented
to and practiced by all civilized nations.14 There are no final arbiters
of its scope: national courts, state courts, and international courts all
consider laws in light of their own interpretations of customary
international law.15
10. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 1 (1969) (defining international law “in its
widest and most comprehensive sense” as regulating these relationships).
11. The Treaty Clause should be read in conjunction with the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (authorizing Congress “[t]o make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution”). The treatymaking power is found in Article 2, Section 2 of the
Constitution. Many treaties may violate international law in substance or jurisdiction by their
overreaching, but as long as they concern matters of national interest, legislation passed to give
them effect in this country will be upheld. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920) (“If
the treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the statute under Article 1,
Section 8, as a necessary and proper means to execute the powers of the Government.”). One
could argue that the Offenses Clause was meant to be merely a means by which treaties may be
enacted into federal law. However, the Supreme Court has held that the power to pass national
legislation in order to effect the terms of a treaty is grounded in the Necessary and Proper
Clause. See id. Therefore, if Congress has made a treaty, the legislation passed pursuant to it
need not be examined in the same way as legislation passed pursuant to the Offenses Clause.
12. The phrase “civilized nations” is used throughout the international law literature but
has no clear definition. See, e.g., M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION:
UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 645 (3d ed. 1996) (“The prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment can be said to constitute a general principle of international law because it
is so regarded by the legal systems of civilized nations.”); Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber
and the Laws of War: The Origins and Limits of the Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 213, 215 (1998) (discussing the “Lieber Code,” the first government codification of the
laws of war, issued by the United States during the Civil War); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our
Land: Customary International Law as Federal Law After Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393, 412
(1997) (quoting James Wilson’s statement at the Constitutional Convention that “[t]o pretend
to define the law of nations which depended on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the
World, would have a look of arrogance that would make us ridiculous”).
13. See 45 AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 3 (1969).
14. See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Yugo.), 1996 I.C.J. 595, 776 (July 11)
(Krea, J., dissenting) (describing the process by which a rule becomes part of customary
international law).
15. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
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Like the Anglo-American common law, customary international
law is organic;16 because it is derived from the practice of nations,
which is always changing, the content and scope of customary
international law is constantly in flux.17 In Blackstone’s time, the law
of nations concerned only “violation of safe conducts, infringement
of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.”18 It now encompasses
crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.19
American courts determine the scope and content of customary
international law in many circumstances, including when adjudicating
the terms of a treaty, or presiding over civil suits brought pursuant to
statutes referencing the law of nations.20 In deciding the scope of
customary international law, courts examine “the customs and usages
of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, [look] to the works of
jurists and commentators.”21 In this way, treaties and other
(interpreting tort law in light of customary international law); Republic of Argentina v. City of
New York, 250 N.E.2d 698, 700-04 (N.Y. 1969) (interpreting tax law in light of customary
international law); Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1996 I.C.J. at 776 (Krea, J., dissenting) (discussing the
relationship between the laws of a sovereign nation and customary international law).
16. For a general overview of customary international law and its role in the international
system, see MARK VILLIGER, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES: A MANUAL
ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERRELATION OF SOURCES (1997).
17. See United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 838 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(noting that the law of nations changes over time); HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR:
THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES 4 (1993) (stating that the crimes against peace and crimes against
humanity are twentieth-century additions to the canon of customary international law); Curtis
A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy of International Human Rights
Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319, 359-60 (1997) [hereinafter Bradley & Goldsmith, Current
Illegitimacy] (discussing questions raised by the changing content of the law of nations);
Remarks of Louis Henkin (Apr. 3, 1998), in International Law in a World of Multiple Actors: A
Conversation with Louis Henkin and Louis B. Sohn, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 248, 259
(1998) (stating that the law of nations is changeable). See generally Josef L. Kunz, Comment,
The Changing Law of Nations, 51 AM. J. INT’L L. 77 (1957) (describing the phenomena which
lead to changes in the law of nations).
18. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68.
19. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal
Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 818 (1997).
20. For instance, the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994), allows private suits
for tortious violations of the law of nations. For a general overview of this Act, see Russell G.
Donaldson, Annotation, Construction and Application of Alien Tort Statute (28 U.S.C.S. §
1350), Providing for Federal Jurisdiction over Alien’s Action for Tort Committed in Violation of
Law of Nations or Treaty of the United States, 116 A.L.R. FED. 387 (1993).
21. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos,
103 F.3d 789, 794 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting The Paquette Habana); Nakeswaran v. I.N.S., No. 93-
2135, 1994 WL 170801, at *1 (1st Cir. May 6, 1994) (same); de Sanchez v. Banco Central de
Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 1385, 1396 n.13 (5th Cir. 1985) (same); Rodriguez-Fernandez v. Wilkinson,
654 F.2d 1382, 1390 n.1 (10th Cir. 1981) (same). For an early expression of this same method,
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agreements do not themselves create customary international law,
but provide evidence of nations’ compliance with a particular rule,
and give concrete proof of a customary law’s existence. In turn,
customary international law informs the interpretation of treaty
agreements.22
B. Types of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction is “the power of a sovereign to affect the rights of
persons, whether by legislation, by executive decree, or by the
judgment of a court.”23 This Note examines the contours of the first
of these, Congress’s power to affect the rights of individuals through
legislation, also known as prescriptive jurisdiction.24 Customary
international law places limits on a nation’s right to assert jurisdiction
over crimes that occurred outside its territory. The degree of
limitation depends on the nature of the crime. Scholars of
international law generally recognize five primary principles that
nations use to justify the exercise of jurisdiction: territorial,
protective, universal, national, and passive personality.25
see United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820) (“What the law of nations . . .
is, may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly on public law; or
by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions recognising and enforcing
that law.”).
22. See Steven P. Croley & John H. Jackson, WTO Dispute Procedures, Standard of
Review, and Deference to National Governments, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 193, 200 (1996) (noting
that the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade directs that its
interpretation be “mindful” of the customary rules of interpretation of international law);
Marian L. Nash, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law, 75
AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 147 (1981) (observing that although the United States has not ratified the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it does apply those of its terms reflecting customary
international law); see also Remarks of Harold Hongju Koh (Apr. 2, 1998), in Contemporary
Conceptions of Customary International Law, 92 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 37, 37-41 (1998)
(discussing the interaction between formal law and customary international law).
23. Joseph H. Beale, The Jurisdiction of a Sovereign State, 36 HARV. L. REV. 241, 241
(1923).
24. See IAIN CAMERON, THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
JURISDICTION 4-5 (1994) (distinguishing between “prescriptive” jurisdiction, which concerns
the power to prescribe laws and regulations, and “enforcement” jurisdiction, which concerns
the power of courts or other entities to perform acts pursuant to these rules); see also Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing
prescriptive jurisdiction).
25. These principles were first outlined in a Harvard study done in 1935. See Research in
International Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, Jurisdiction
with Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT’L L. 443, 445 (Supp. 1935). For an example of a federal
court’s recognition of these principles, see Rocha v. United States, 288 F.2d 545, 549 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1961). Some scholars recognize additional principles of jurisdiction: the “flag principle”
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The territorial principle permits jurisdiction over all crimes
committed within a nation’s borders, regardless of the nationalities of
the victim and the perpetrator.26 At one point, territorial jurisdiction
was the sole source of legitimate criminal jurisdiction over everything
but the high seas.27 Territorial jurisdiction is universally recognized as
legitimate under customary international law for all crimes.28
The protective principle allows the assertion of jurisdiction when
the national interest is threatened by an act, regardless of where that
act occurs.29 A limited range of crucial national interests are
implicated, including threats to national security or the national
treasury.30 The protective principle is based on the theory that every
nation has a right to defend against assaults on its sovereignty.31
(allowing jurisdiction on ships and airplanes registered in the country); the “representation
principle” (allowing one country to stand in for another in the prosecution of a crime when the
act is illegal in both places); and the “principle of distribution of competence” (allowing the
state where the offense occurred to waive prosecution in favor of the offender’s state of
nationality or domicile). CAMERON, supra note 24, at 18.
26. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (5th ed. 1998).
27. See infra note 63.
28. See Wade Estey, Note, The Five Bases of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and the Failure of
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 21 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 177, 177
(1997) (“There is little debate that a nation may exercise territorial jurisdiction over and thus
promulgate laws regulating persons, things or transactions within the nation’s territory.”).
Although Supreme Court decisions are not conclusive interpretations of international law, they
provide important insights. In one of its early decisions, the Supreme Court held that
“[l]egislation of every country is territorial; that beyond its own territory, it can only affect its
own subjects or citizens.” Rose v. Himely, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 241, 279 (1808). As recently as
1957, the Supreme Court stated that a “sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to punish
offenses against its laws committed within its borders, unless it expressly or impliedly consents
to surrender its jurisdiction.” Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957) (per curiam) (emphasis
added).
29. See United States v. Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d 356, 358 (5th Cir. 1979) (dictum)
(noting that U.S. courts “have jurisdiction to enforce criminal laws wherever and by whomever
the act is performed that threatens the country’s security or directly interferes with its
governmental operations”); CAMERON, supra note 24, at 2 (defining the protective principle);
see also United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1968) (sustaining a conviction for
false statements to a government official made outside the United States in connection with a
visa application).
30. See Columba-Colella, 604 F.2d at 358 (dictum) (“A state/nation is competent . . . to
punish one who has successfully defrauded its treasury, no matter where the fraudulent scheme
was perpetrated.”); Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 999 F. Supp. 1, 15 n.7 (D.D.C. 1998)
(stating that American “victims of foreign state sponsored terrorism” may invoke protective
jurisdiction in civil actions against those governments based on the “national security interests”
involved); see also CAMERON, supra note 24, at 3 (cataloging the various offenses that have
been included within the scope of the protective principle); Monika B. Krizek, Note, The
Protective Principle of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: A Brief History and an Application of the
Principle to Espionage as an Illustration of Current United States Practice, 6 B.U. INT’L L.J. 337,
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The universal principle permits jurisdiction over certain crimes,
such as genocide, that are universally offensive32 and universally
punished because of the extreme horror that they evoke.33 Because
such crimes threaten the very nature of humanity itself, every nation
has the right, and perhaps the duty, to prosecute these crimes and
prevent their recurrence.34 However, it is important to distinguish
between universal condemnation and universal jurisdiction. All
crimes against customary international law are looked upon as illegal
by the community of nations,35 but this widespread condemnation
does not translate into agreement that the crime should be subject to
universal jurisdiction. Both genocide and the wearing of an enemy
uniform36 are universally recognized as against the laws of war but,
between the two, only genocide merits universal jurisdiction.37
The two most controversial jurisdictional bases are the
nationality principle and the passive personality principle. A court
that used the nationality principle would allow a country to punish its
own citizens for certain crimes regardless of where committed.38 The
U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized this jurisdictional theory,
stating in 1824 that “[t]he laws of no nation can justly extend beyond
337-46 (1988).
31. The Supreme Court has held that “criminal statutes . . . are, as a class, not logically
dependent on their locality for the Government’s jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the
right of the Government to defend itself against obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated,
especially if committed by its own citizens, officers or agents.” United States v. Bowman, 260
U.S. 94, 98 (1922). In Bowman, the Court ruled that a statute prohibiting false claims to the
government or to corporations in which it held stock had extraterritorial application. See id.
32. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating, in the context
of war crimes allegedly committed by a former Nazi concentration camp guard, that “some
crimes are so universally condemned that the perpetrators are the enemies of all people,” and
concluding that “any nation which has custody of the perpetrators may punish them according
to its law”).
33. See Beverly Izes, Note, Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned Abductions
of War Criminals Should Be Permitted, 31 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 11 (1997) (outlining
the theory behind universal jurisdiction).
34. See id.
35. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102(2) (1986) [hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT] (“Customary international law
results from a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation.”).
36. See Howard S. Levie, The 1977 Protocol I and the United States, 38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
469, 479 (1993) (citing the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, art.
39(2), 16 I.L.M. 1391, 1409).
37. See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
38. See CAMERON, supra note 24, at 17.
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its own territories, except so far as regards its own citizens.”39 More
recently, the Court observed that “[c]itizenship as a head of
jurisdiction and a ground of protection was old when Paul invoked it
in his appeal to Caesar.”40 However, jurisdiction based on nationality
is not clearly recognized by the international community.41
Finally, the passive personality principle would permit
jurisdiction based on the citizenship of the victim.42 Passive
personality jurisdiction would allow a nation to punish anyone who
harms any of its citizens in violation of its laws, regardless of where
the harm occurs.43 This form of jurisdiction is still generally
disfavored44 and probably not a part of customary international law,45
as nations tend to “jealously guard[]” their exclusive right to decide
what is criminal on their own soil.46
Some lower courts in the United States have misunderstood the
repeated articulation of these five principles to mean that all five
39. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
40. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950).
41. See Geoffrey R. Watson, Offenders Abroad: The Case for Nationality-Based Criminal
Jurisdiction, 17 YALE J. INT’L L. 41 (1992) (discussing the United States’s past reluctance to use
the nationality principle and arguing for its greater application); Edmund S. McAlister, Note,
The Hydraulic Pressure of Vengeance: United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Case for a
Justifiable Abduction, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 449, 457-58 (1994) (noting that nations have
differing approaches to nationality-based jurisdiction). Several federal statutes provide for
jurisdiction based solely on the nationality of the offender, including the perjury, espionage,
and tax evasion statutes. See Watson, supra, at 53 & nn.79-81 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1994)
(perjury); id. §§ 793-794 (espionage); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1994) (tax evasion)). Nationality
jurisdiction is not justified in every circumstance, and it is most widely accepted when based on
the duty or loyalty owed by citizens to their (prosecuting) homelands. See Estey, supra note 28,
at 182.
42. See Rüdiger Wolfrum, The Decentralized Prosecution of International Offences
Through National Courts, in WAR CRIMES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 233, 234 (Yoram Dinstein
& Mala Tabory eds., 1996) (defining passive personality jurisdiction); Carol S. Goldstein,
Casenote, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of Federal Criminal Law: The Assassination of
Congressman Ryan, 14 LAW. AM. 61, 65 (1982) (same).
43. John G. McCarthy, Note, The Passive Personality Principle and Its Use in Combating
International Terrorism, 13 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 298, 299-300 (1989-1990).
44. See LEVIE, supra note 17, at 231 (noting that the passive personality principle is
“extremely controversial”); Wolfrum, supra note 42, at 234 (stating that passive personality
jurisdiction is “not generally recognized”). For a discussion of why passive personality is
disfavored, see Jürgen Meyer, The Vicarious Administration of Justice: An Overlooked Basis of
Jurisdiction, 31 HARV. INT’L L.J. 108, 113-14 (1990).
45. See Geoffrey R. Watson, The Passive Personality Principle, 28 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 13
(1993) (noting that passive personality is not widely practiced and probably not an accepted
form of jurisdiction under customary international law).
46. See CAMERON, supra note 24, at 6.
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principles are legitimate under international law.47 For example, in
United States v. Benitez,48 the Eleventh Circuit stated that “[t]he law
of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation
under five general principles.”49 The court went on to conclude that
jurisdiction over Colombians who had shot DEA agents in Colombia
was proper under the protective principle, but also stated that the
passive personality principle would have been a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction.50 After correctly discussing the protective principle,
which was indeed sufficient, the court added this troublesome dictum:
“[T]he nationality of the victims, who are also U.S. government
agents, clearly supports jurisdiction.”51 The court carelessly endorsed
the passive personality principle as a viable principle under federal
law, without considering whether it was legitimate under customary
international law.
C. Jurisdictional Principles: Law or Comity?
It is unclear whether the jurisdictional principles discussed above
are binding under international law. They are sometimes treated as if
they are principles of comity—discretionary standards that have
evolved over time to encourage courts to refrain from entering
disputes that primarily involve other nations.52 If that is the case, then
they are not so much international law as international conventions,
and nations are technically free to disregard them. Doing so might
47. See, e.g., United States v. MacAllister, 160 F.3d 1304, 1308 n.9 (11th Cir. 1998) (“The
law of nations permits the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five general
principles . . . . Extraterritorial application of penal laws may be justified under any of these
five principles.”); United States v. Rezaq, 134 F.3d 1121, 1133 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (applying the
passive personality principle without acknowledging its precarious status under international
law); Rivard v. United States, 375 F.2d 882, 885 (5th Cir. 1967) (“The law of nations permits
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by a nation under five general principles. They are the
territorial, national, protective, universality, and passive personality principles.”) (footnotes
omitted). But see Neely v. Club Med Management Servs., 63 F.3d 166, 185 (3d Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging that the passive personality principle “‘has not been generally accepted for
ordinary torts or crimes’”) (quoting THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 35, § 402 cmt. g).
48. 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984).
49. Id. at 1316 (quoting Rivard, 375 F.2d at 885) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. See id.
51. Id. (emphasis added).
52. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(characterizing the jurisdictional rules as principles of comity); see also Brian Pearce, The
Comity Doctrine as a Barrier to Judicial Jurisdiction: A U.S.-E.U. Comparison, 30 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 525, 527 (1994) (“[C]omity refers to diplomatic niceties performed by states out of a
sense of international etiquette rather than binding obligation.”).
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offend other nations, but would not violate customary international
law. On the other hand, if the jurisdictional principles are binding
law, then a country that disregards them in bringing a prosecution
violates international law.53
The difference between treating jurisdiction as law or comity is
ordinarily semantic. The consequences of violating international
jurisdictional principles are the same whether those principles are
understood as law or comity.54 However, in the context of the
Offenses Clause, the distinction is vital because the Clause gives
constitutional significance to the phrase “law of nations.”55 If the
jurisdictional limits are not binding under international law, then they
are not a part of the Offenses Clause. Conversely, if the law of
nations includes jurisdictional limits, then so does the Offenses
Clause. In that case, Congress must abide by those limits when
legislating pursuant to the authority found in the Offenses Clause.
The more sensible interpretation of international law is that the
jurisdictional limits are binding. A central purpose of international
law is to define the relationships between countries, which it can only
do in a meaningful way by the imposition of limits or substantial
restraints on the ability of one country to act in ways that affect
another.56 If the jurisdictional principles are only discretionary, any
violation of international law could be punished by any nation,
53. For a discussion of the inconsistent ways in which violations of international law are
litigated and punished in international forums, see BURNS H. WESTON ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED CASEBOOK 214-50 (3d ed. 1997).
54. In the United States, international law only controls in the absence of other controlling
authority. See The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that international law
controls “where there is no treaty and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial
decision”). However, courts may still employ international law as a tool of statutory
construction, presuming that Congress will not legislate in violation of international law. See
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (citing Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6
U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .”)); see also Ralph G.
Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory Construction, 43
VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1990) (“It is plain, however, that the interpretive role of
international law is more common than its controlling role.”). As a discretionary aid to
interpretation, then, principles of international law gain force from their persuasiveness, not
their status as either law or comity.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
56. See Hersch Lauterpacht, The So-Called Anglo-American and Continental Schools of
Thought in International Law, 12 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 31 (1931) (“International law is not
concerned with matters of municipal law; it is concerned with relations between States.”),
quoted in L. Amede Obiora, Toward an Auspicious Reconciliation of International and
Comparative Analyses, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 669, 671 (1998).
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regardless of location or connection to the prosecuting country. Since
theft is universally condemned, international law would not prevent
the United States from prosecuting French thieves. This is troubling
not only for the Frenchman who finds himself subject to punishment
across the globe for a crime committed at home, but for the
sovereignty of France as well. In most circumstances, enlightened
self-interest, as well as comity, keeps one nation from intruding on
the affairs of another. The United States generally has no interest in
prosecuting French thefts. However, if it developed such an interest,
comity would not provide a sufficient restraint. For international law
to serve a meaningful role, it must set its own limits, and the
jurisdictional limits must be as binding as the substantive limits.
II. THE OFFENSES CLAUSE IMPLICITLY INCORPORATES THE
JURISDICTIONAL LIMITS OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
In recent years, Congress has passed a series of statutes
incorporating international law.57 One of the most striking attributes
of these laws is that they allow for broad criminal jurisdiction over
acts occurring outside the United States. Several statutes include
provisions allowing for jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
offender or the victim,58 both of which rely on questionable
jurisdictional principles.59 The Offenses Clause was invoked in
congressional debate as an independent source of authority for
several of these statutes, but the scope of jurisdiction permitted by
the Clause was never raised.60
Congress is generally unrestrained by the jurisdictional
principles of international law.61 It may choose to comply with them
or ignore them, but such choice does not typically implicate
57. See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-
1 note (West Supp. 1999); War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. III 1997); Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (1994).
58. See War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. III 1997) (authorizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction for offenses by or against United States nationals); Biological
Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994) (same).
59. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
60. The author found no extensive discussion of the scope of the Offenses Clause in any of
the congressional testimony cited supra note 7; the Clause was simply invoked and
unquestioned.
61. In the United States, international law governs “only where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision.” Gisbert v. United States Attorney
Gen., 988 F.2d 1437, 1447 (5th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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constitutional concerns. However, this Note argues that by explicitly
addressing a separate body of law—the law of nations—the Offenses
Clause raises a unique exception to the general rule. No other
provision of the Constitution refers to a separate body of law in this
way.
There are three plausible readings of the scope of congressional
power when legislating pursuant to the Offenses Clause. First,
Congress might be completely unrestrained by international law. In
other words, Congress may independently “define” both substantive
offenses and jurisdictional rules. Second, under an “unfettered
jurisdiction” model, the Offenses Clause may require that Congress
follow the substance of the law of nations, but leave Congress free to
create jurisdictional rules. Finally, under a “limited jurisdiction”
model, the Offenses Clause may incorporate both the substantive and
jurisdictional rules of international law. The following sections
explore the merits of the latter two62 of these perspectives in light of
history, constitutional text and structure, and case law.
A. History
In the eighteenth century, sovereign jurisdiction almost never
extended beyond a nation’s borders.63 Maritime jurisdiction, consent,
and some cases of treachery abroad were among the few exceptions
to the general rule of territorial jurisdiction.64 Therefore, the absence
62. Charles Siegal has persuasively dismissed the first model, arguing that legislation
based on the Offenses Clause must be substantively based on principles of international law.
See Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress’ Power to “Define . . . Offenses
Against the Law of Nations”, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 865, 886 (1988) (“[W]hile
progressiveness and flexibility are built into the Offenses Clause, there are limits beyond which
Congress may not go . . . . There must be an international law offense, with some reasonable
degree of substance.”).
63. See Bradley & Goldsmith, Current Illegitimacy, supra note 17, at 361
(“[E]xtraterritorial regulation would have been unthinkable in the eighteenth century, a time
when each nation’s regulatory power was limited to conduct either within the nation’s territory
or by the nation’s citizens.”); see also GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN
UNITED STATES COURTS 493-97, 549-50 (3d ed. 1996) (discussing the nineteenth-century view
that international law imposed territorial limits on jurisdiction); William R. Casto, The Federal
Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18
CONN. L. REV. 467, 488-98 (1986) (outlining the arguments surrounding the debate and
enactment by the First Congress of the Alien Tort Claims Act, originally a component of the
Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79 (1789) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
1350 (1994)), which gives federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens
for torts committed in violation of the law of nations or a U.S. treaty).
64. See Alfred Paul LeBlanc, Jr., Note, United States v. Alvarez-Machain and the Status of
International Law in American Courts, 53 LA. L. REV. 1411, 1473 (1993) (discussing admiralty
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of an explicit textual limitation on extraterritorial jurisdiction in the
Constitution can probably be attributed to the fact that no one
thought it necessary.
Moreover, the Framers understood the law of nations to be
based on natural law conceptions of absolute right and wrong,65 and
thus binding on all nations.66 There is no reason to suppose its
jurisdictional aspects were accorded any less weight. Therefore, the
Offenses Clause was probably only meant to allow legislation that
complied with the jurisdictional principles of international law.
The specific history behind the drafting of the Offenses Clause,
though sparse, clarifies its meaning. The history indicates that the
Offenses Clause was designed to serve two primary purposes: to
ensure federal control over international relations, and to enable
Congress to codify unclear international law.
The Articles of Confederation provided the central government
with the power to establish courts that could hear cases involving
piracies and crimes committed on the high seas,67 but did not confer
the power to define or punish violations of international law. This
omission was perceived as a serious shortcoming because it meant
that each state could control its own relations with foreign nations.68
and maritime jurisdiction).
65. See Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 819, 822 (1989) (“In the eighteenth century a consensus existed that the law of nations
rested in large measure on natural law.”); Jules Lobel, The Limits of Constitutional Power:
Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and International Law, 71 VA. L. REV. 1071, 1131 (1985)
(“The framers’ conception of fundamental international law, however, was derived largely
from natural law theory.”); Siegal, supra note 62, at 868 n.12 (“[T]he basis of much eighteenth
century American constitutional theory rested on the natural law concepts of such international
law writers as Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Vattel, and Rutherforth.”). Natural law has been
described as a set of rules “prescribed by an authority superior to the state . . . derived from
divine commandment, from right reason with which man is endowed by his Creator, from the
nature of mankind empirically regarded, from the abstract Reason of the Enlightenment, or
from the long experience of humankind in community.” Russell Kirk, Natural Law and the
Constitution of the United States, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1036 (1994).
66. See Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L. REV.
1555, 1566 (1984) (“The law of nations of the time was not seen as something imposed on the
states by the new [federal] government; it had been binding on and accepted by the states
before the [central] government was even established.”); Jay, supra note 65, at 827 (“Jurists of
this era also typically recited that as to its obligatory elements the law of nations could not be
violated by positive enactments.”).
67. See Articles of Confederation art. IX (1781).
68. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 272 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976)
(“These articles contain no provision for the cases or offenses against the law of nations; and
consequently leave it in the power of any indiscrete member to embroil the Confederacy with
foreign nations.”).
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This arrangement had the potential to threaten the union, as a single
state could unilaterally offend other countries and bring war upon the
federation.69
A noteworthy incident in the early 1780s may have influenced
the formulation of the Offenses Clause. A Frenchman named De
Longchamps insulted and struck the cane of Marbois, the French
Counsel General to Pennsylvania in 1784.70 The incident caused
international unrest,71 but the Continental Congress had no authority
to punish the offender.72 Foreign ministers complained, “demand[ing]
that Congress declare the law of nations to be part of the common
law of each of the states.”73
Shortly thereafter, the first draft of the Constitution vested
Congress with the power “[t]o declare the law and punishment of
piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment
of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offenses against
the law of nations.”74 A following draft—supposed to be the final
draft—allowed for Congress to “define and punish piracies . . . and
punish offences against the law of nations.”75 However, the
Committee of Style voted to reconsider the phrasing,76 which led to a
debate between Governour Morris and James Wilson.
Morris proposed to change the sentence structure so that “define
and punish” would apply to both piracies and offenses against the law
69. See Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquette Habana: Is Violation of Customary
International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 321, 333 & n.79
(1986) (discussing the Framers’ fears that “the absence of legislative authority to punish
offenses against international law . . . would permit reckless citizens and states to entangle the
United States in conflicts with foreign nations”).
70. See Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 111 (Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer
1784); Casto, supra note 63, at 491-94 (describing the incident and its influence on the
Constitutional Convention).
71. See Kenneth C. Randall, Federal Jurisdiction over International Law Claims: Inquiries
into the Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 24 (1985) (“The [De Longchamps]
incident drew irate responses from the foreign ministers of France and other nations.”).
72. See id. at 25 (“The attack on Marbois brought to light one of the deficiencies in the
government constituted by the Articles of Confederation. The central government had no
executive or judicial departments and obviously was incompetent to deal with the situation.”).
However, Pennsylvania did heed a congressional request to take the matter seriously,
imprisoning De Longchamps for over two years. See De Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 118.
73. See Randall, supra note 71, at 24 (quoting Rosenthal, The Marbois-Longchamps
Affair, 63 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 294, 296 (1939)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
74. 1 DRAFTING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 890 (Wilbourn Benton ed., 1986) (emphasis
added).
75. Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
76. See id. at 932.
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of nations.77 Wilson objected: “To pretend to define the law of nations
which depended on the authority of all the Civilized nations of the
World, would have a look of arrogance, that would make us
ridiculous.”78 Morris responded that the use of the word “define” was
appropriate for the “law of nations” because “the law of nations [was]
often too vague and deficient to be a rule.”79
Morris was concerned that the “law of nations” would be too
imprecise to constitute federal law, and wanted to ensure that
Congress had the power—and even the responsibility—to codify
specific crimes. His proposal passed by a close vote of six to five.80
The final form, as it exists in the ratified Constitution, empowers
Congress to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”81
The Offenses Clause generated little negative attention during
the ratification debates. However, the Anti-Federalist “Cincinnatus”
did write an argumentative open letter to James Wilson:
[T]he proposed Congress are empowered to define and punish
offences against the law of nations—mark well, Sir, if you please,
define and punish. Will you, will anyone say, can anyone even think
that does not comprehend a power to define and declare all
publications from the press against the conduct of government, in
making treaties, or in any other foreign transactions, an offence
against the law of nations?82
“Cincinnatus” expressed concern that the Offenses Clause had the
capacity to swallow up other protections, in particular those of free
speech. He worried that the grant of power was so broad that
Congress could use it to restrict the freedoms of speech and the press
by “defining” anti-treaty propaganda as an “offence against the law
of nations.”
The concerns voiced by Wilson and expounded upon by
“Cincinnatus” were not answered by their opponents. In the
77. See 2 JAMES MADISON, DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 563
(Gallard Hunt & James Brown Scott, eds. 1987) (“Mr. Gov’r. Morris moved to strike out
‘punish’ before the words ‘offences agst. the law of nations,’ so as to let these be definable as
well as punishable, by virtue of the preceding member of the sentence.”).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. See id.
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
82. Letter from “Cincinnatus” to James Wilson, N.Y. J., Nov. 1, 1787, reprinted in 6 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 7, 8 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981).
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Federalist Papers, Hamilton, Madison, and Jay each referred to the
Clause,83 but never discussed its scope. Its importance to the
Federalists lay in ensuring stability among the states in international
affairs so that a rogue state could not bring war on the others.84 In
The Federalist No. 3, for example, Jay addressed concerns about
security, arguing that the federal government was best suited to
protect citizens from external hostilities.85 He argued that “[i]t is of
high importance to the peace of America, that she observe the laws
of nations towards all these Powers.”86 Only the national government
would not be infected by that “pride of states,” which could spur
action against other nations upon the slightest perception of a
violation of international law.87
So the Offenses Clause was designed to have two roles: (1) to
ensure that control over international affairs remained with the
central government, not the individual states; and (2) to enable
Congress to clarify unclear international law. It was not intended to
grant Congress the power to create its own version of international
law, or to employ some of its provisions and not others. The history
reveals a relatively unambitious clause intended to do little work, and
therefore supports the more constrained “limited jurisdiction”
reading.
The “unfettered jurisdiction” interpretation, on the other hand,
would not fit with the Framers’ understanding of the role of nations
in international affairs. If the Clause carries no jurisdictional
limitations, Congress could “define” any act that violates the law of
nations, such as wearing an enemy uniform, as meriting
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
83. See Glennon, supra note 69, at 333 n.79 (highlighting Hamilton’s concern that if the
federal government lacked the exclusive power to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations, “‘the faith of the United States may be broken, their reputation sullied, and their peace
interrupted by the negligence or misconception of any particular state’”) (citation omitted).
Madison predicted that a rogue state could “embroil the Confederacy with foreign nations.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 68, at 272. John Jay also addressed the Clause in The
Federalist No. 3. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
84. See Glennon, supra note 69, at 333.
85. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 13-17 (John Jay) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1976). The
Federalist No. 42 and The Federalist No. 80 contain other discussions of the Offenses Clause.
86. Id. at 14. The “powers” to which Jay referred were those countries with which the
United States had signed treaties.
87. See id. Madison agreed that the federal government was the proper body to administer
the law of nations. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, supra note 68, at 272; see also Stephens, supra
note 12, at 404-13 (arguing that the Framers drafted the Offenses Clause to ensure federal
control over international affairs).
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A consideration of the De Longchamps affair—a likely stimulus
for the creation of the Clause—is instructive. Although the Court in
that case stated that “[w]hoever offers any violence to [a
diplomat] . . . is guilty of a crime against the whole world,”88
jurisdiction was in fact based on the territorial principle, not the
universal principle. Under the “unfettered jurisdiction” model,
however, a modern De Longchamps could be punished under federal
law for tapping Marbois’s cane and telling him “je vous
deshonnerera!”89 whether the incident occurred in the United States
or in Sweden.
To the extent that the Offenses Clause was an attempt to ensure
effective punishment in case of future international incidents
occurring on American soil,90 extraterritorial jurisdiction of any sort
was unnecessary because territorial jurisdiction would suffice.
Moreover, conferring jurisdiction that exceeds that permitted by
international law could cause a similar uproar in the international
community.91 The De Longchamps situation was embarrassing
because Congress did not have the power to enforce international law
within the United States; there would have been no uproar had the
incident occurred in Spain. A clause designed to promote compliance
with international law should not be read so as to confer the power to
violate that law.
B. Text
This section explores the role of text—both the text of the
Offenses Clause and that of surrounding constitutional provisions—
in interpreting the Clause according to the two perspectives set forth
above. Although the text is vague, the more sensible reading favors
the “limited jurisdiction” interpretation.
88. Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111, 116 (Pa. Ct. Oyer & Terminer
1784).
89. See id. at 111; supra note 70 and accompanying text.
90. See Casto, supra note 63, at 492 (“The [De Longchamps] Affair was a national
sensation that attracted the concern of virtually every public figure in America.”); see also id. at
492-94 & n.143 (recounting the concern expressed over the incident both at the Constitutional
Convention and by individuals such as George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Madison).
91. But see Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth
Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1217, 1252 (1992) (“The drafters of this clause
may well have anticipated its application to cases with no overt connection to the United
States, for . . . most offenses against the law of nations would have no nexus with American
territory.”).
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1. The Offenses Clause. In terms of jurisdiction, the most
notable attribute of the Offenses Clause is what it lacks. Nowhere is
Congress given the power to “define” anything but “offenses.” It is
not given the power to define jurisdiction. Given that both
substantive crimes and the appropriate jurisdictional rules are
fundamental aspects of international law, the absence is conspicuous.
After all, jurisdictional limitations are just as vital to international
relations as the substantive rules to which they relate. If there is no
grant of power to express jurisdictional limits, Congress must
legislate within the existing limits provided by customary
international law. The absence of a jurisdictional grant implies that
Congress can “define” offenses, but not jurisdiction.
Admittedly, the text could also support the “unfettered”
interpretation. The words “define” and “punish” are both susceptible
of broad readings, possibly granting Congress unlimited power to
proscribe any acts in any manner, unconstrained by the law of
nations. Moreover, the first part of the Clause, referring to
“piracies,”92 has both substantive and jurisdictional components.
Congress can punish piracies (a substantive grant of power)
committed on the high seas (a jurisdictional limitation). The Offenses
Clause, however, is without a corresponding limit: Congress can
punish offenses against the law of nations (a substantive grant) . . .
anywhere? This reading would essentially grant Congress the power
to define and punish offenses against the law of nations wherever they
occur.
However, this “unfettered jurisdiction” reading forces an
interpretation of the Clause whereby the power to enforce the law of
nations could be used to violate that same law. For instance, it would
permit Congress to outlaw all assaults against diplomats without a
jurisdictional limit. But the United States could not enforce such a
law against a foreigner who assaulted a non-U.S. citizen outside of
the United States without violating the jurisdictional rules of the law
of nations. Also, adding an express textual qualification would have
been needlessly redundant. Imagine if the Clause read as follows,
granting Congress the power to “define and punish Piracies and
Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law
of Nations as circumscribed by the Law of Nations.” No reference to
jurisdiction was necessary because it was clearly implied by context.
92. “The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o define and punish Piracies and Felonies
committed on the high Seas . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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2. Other Clauses. Related provisions clarify the place of the
Offenses Clause in the constitutional vision of the Framers. Several
clauses implicitly address the role of the United States in the
international community. For example, the first clause of Article I,
Section 8, empowers Congress to “provide for the common Defence
and General Welfare of the United States.”93 By according Congress
the power to protect the welfare of the United States, this clause
counsels against legislation whose purpose is the defense of citizens
and entities unrelated to this country.
The Declaration Clause grants Congress the power to “make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”94 The substantive
grant of power is clear: the rules made pursuant to the Clause must
concern land or water capture. According to its simple terms, the
Clause could allow Congress to make rules concerning capture (by
anyone) on (any) land or (any) water. However, despite the absence
of any explicit jurisdictional limitation on the Clause, the most
sensible reading implicitly limits it to captures of enemy troops by
U.S. soldiers. Otherwise, Congress could make rules for Japan’s
capture of enemy troops. Besides being futile, such rulemaking would
clearly violate international norms. Likewise, the constitutional
ability to “make rules for the regulation of land and naval forces”95
can apply only to U.S. forces. This has never been litigated because
Congress would never even debate whether it should make rules for
the Japanese army.
The Offenses Clause should be read in a similar way. A limit on
its jurisdictional reach should be implied such that it extends only as
far as the law of nations allows. Just as it seems sensible to assume
that the Declaration Clause is not meant to allow Congress to
prescribe rules for foreign troops, it seems equally sensible to assume
that the Offenses Clause does not authorize punishments of
international crimes where the punishments themselves are
international crimes. For example, wearing an enemy uniform during
attack violates the law of nations.96 But an American prosecution of a
Turkish soldier for wearing a German uniform would also violate the
law of nations, which prohibits countries from interjecting themselves
93. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
94. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
95. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
96. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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into other quarrels.97 A clause intended to promote compliance with
international law should not be read so as to facilitate violations of
that law.
C. Sovereignty, Structure, Context, and Policy
This section discusses the nature of sovereignty, constitutional
structure, the antipathy to police power, and policy considerations as
they relate to the best reading of the Offenses Clause. All of these
indicate that Congress should not have unfettered discretion to pick
and choose jurisdictional principles when legislating pursuant to the
Clause.
The nature of sovereignty itself implies a jurisdictional limitation
in the Clause. Although we have a limited federal government, there
are certain powers, inherent in the very idea of sovereignty, that can
be exercised despite the absence of a specific grant of power.98 For
example, the Supreme Court has held that there is implicit
congressional power to legislate in furtherance of domestic interests
in foreign affairs: “Although there is in the Constitution no specific
grant to Congress of power to enact legislation for the effective
regulation of foreign affairs, there can be no doubt of the existence of
this power in the law-making organ of the Nation.”99 The idea of
powers inhering in the nature of sovereignty has been drawn on in
other areas and is rooted in the practices of nations over time.100 But
if Congress accepts the implied powers of sovereignty, it follows that
it must also accept the implied limitations, one of which is
97. Exercising jurisdiction in this manner would be a violation of the law of nations in all
but the most egregious circumstances, in which case universal or protective jurisdiction might
be appropriate. See supra Part I.B.
98. With these inherent powers come inherent responsibilities. See infra note 101.
99. Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 57 (1958).
100. See Lobel, supra note 65, at 1131-33 (discussing the inherent powers of sovereignty
possessed by the political branches of the federal government) (citing Perez, 356 U.S. at 57
(holding that Congress has the implied power to “enact legislation for the effective regulation
of foreign affairs”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936)
(“The powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain
diplomatic relations with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the
Constitution, would have vested in the federal government as necessary concomitants of
nationality.”); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (holding that the power to
exercise dominion and control over new territories is held by all civilized countries by virtue of
the law of nations); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 609 (1889) (holding that the
power to exclude aliens is “an incident of sovereignty”)).
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compliance with international law.101 Although other constitutional
grants of power may enable Congress to violate international law,102
the Offenses Clause—designed to promote conformity with
international law—should not.
The Preamble provides another hint as to the proper reading of
the Offenses Clause, stating: “[w]e the People of the United States, in
Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and
our Posterity . . . .”103 By its focus on “domestic tranquility” and
“common defence,” the Preamble encourages a reading of the
subsequent grants of power in terms that are inward-looking, rather
than outward-looking. Read in this light, the Offenses Clause should
not provide for unlimited extraterritorial jurisdiction.
One might argue that domestic tranquility and common defense
are ends, not means, and if they can be secured by exercising
universal jurisdiction over certain crimes, regardless of whether
international law sanctions such an assertion of jurisdiction, then the
Preamble is satisfied. However, by definition, crimes that require
universal jurisdiction have little connection to the United States.104
The inward-looking focus of the Preamble provides a lens through
which to interpret the rest of the Constitution. In that light, it
counsels against asserting jurisdiction when American interests are
not implicated—a reading that incorporates the limited jurisdictional
principles of customary international law.
The Clause should also be informed by the Framers’ wariness of
excessive police power.105 It seems unlikely that they would have
granted unlimited power over a field of criminal law given the
101. See id. The Framers understood this dynamic. As Chief Justice, John Jay explained
that “‘[w]e had become a nation—as such, we were responsible to others for the observance of
the Laws of Nations.’” Jay, supra note 65, at 825 (quoting Chief Justice Jay’s Charge to the
Grand Jury for the District of New York (April 4, 1790)); see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S.
(2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793) (“[B]y taking a place among the nations of the earth, [the United
States had] become amenable to the laws of nations.”).
102. See supra note 6.
103. U.S. CONST. preamble.
104. If the crime involved central national interests it would be subject to protective
jurisdiction, and if it involved an American victim or perpetrator it would be subject to passive
personality or nationality jurisdiction, so long as those bases are accepted under international
law. See supra Part I.B.
105. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (discussing the Framers’ attempt to
prevent tyranny through constitutional structure).
TEACHOUT TO PRINTER.DOC 10/14/99 9:38 AM
1999] THE OFFENSES CLAUSE 1327
potential threat to liberty. In fact, the Constitution includes several
checks against a broad federal police power, such as the specific and
limited definition of treason.106 The Framers are unlikely to have so
carefully restricted the scope of treason, yet left the field of crimes
against the law of nations wide open. Otherwise, the power to
“define” crimes could be abused to punish political enemies, exercise
undue control over distant lands,107 or become excessively entangled
in foreign political controversies, all with the attendant risks of war.
D. Case Law
The majority of cases that have addressed the Offenses Clause
have focused on Congress’s ability to outlaw, or delegate the power
to outlaw, violations of the law of nations without specifying the
elements of the offense. Although the cases demonstrate extreme
deference to congressional delegations of the Offenses Clause power,
they consistently suggest that the Clause can only be used in
conformity with international law because the law of nations is
exterior to the United States and not changeable by Congress.
Although no Supreme Court case is directly on point, a few provide a
helpful background.
In United States v. Smith,108 a defendant challenged his conviction
under a federal statute outlawing “piracy, as defined by the law of
nations.”109 The statute did not set forth the elements of piracy, and
the defendant argued that the Piracy Clause110 required Congress to
“define” the crime more exactly.111 Justice Story, for the majority,
exhaustively examined the crime of piracy in international law,
investigating whether international law specified piracy to such a
degree that Congress did not need to outline the elements of piracy
in order to outlaw it.112 He concluded that piracy was defined with
106. The Constitution provides that treason against the United States “shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.” U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 3 (emphasis added).
107. Although the Constitution shows no real concern for noncitizens, the Framers
themselves had been involved in a revolt from a distant government, in which they had no
direct control, and which had exercised police power over them.
108. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
109. Id. at 157.
110. Congress is empowered to “define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
111. See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 156-57.
112. See id. at 158-65.
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reasonable certainty by the law of nations, and that Congress did not
misuse its power to define and punish when it outlawed piracy
without specifying the elements of the crime.113
Although Smith did not directly concern the Offenses Clause,
the decision is still revealing. Story distinguished piracy from felonies
on the high seas and offenses against the law of nations which
“cannot, with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and
defined in any public code recognised by the common consent of
nations.” He continued, “[i]n respect . . . to offences against the law
of nations, there is a peculiar fitness in giving the power to define as
well as to punish.”114 In other words, Story thought that the law of
nations was too vague to support proscribing violations of it in
general terms. If Congress was to outlaw crimes against the law of
nations, it had the power, and the duty, to define those crimes with
specificity.
The Smith dictum was rejected by the Supreme Court in the
1940s. In Ex parte Quirin115 and In re Yamashita,116 the Court
concluded that Congress could exercise its Offenses Clause power to
outlaw violations of the law of nations without expressing the specific
elements of the crime. In Quirin, the Court held that a military
commission had jurisdiction under the Constitution to try German
saboteurs for violating the laws of war, a subset of the law of
nations.117 The petitioners in Quirin were trained German saboteurs
who landed in the United States to destroy military facilities during
World War II.118 They were apprehended and charged with violating
the laws of war119 by a military justice commission established by the
President.120
The saboteurs argued that the President did not have the
constitutional authority to create the military tribunals.121 Such
authority, they claimed, belonged to Congress alone.122 The Court
113. See id. at 158.
114. Id. at 159.
115. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
116. 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
117. See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25.
118. See id. at 21.
119. See id. at 23.
120. See id. at 22-23. Throughout the trial and the habeas corpus proceedings, Germany and
the United States remained at war.
121. See id. at 24.
122. See id. at 9.
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examined the various presidential and congressional duties and
responsibilities conferred by the Constitution regarding the laws of
war,123 and concluded that Congress had implicitly—and acceptably—
delegated its Offenses Clause authority.124 The Court held that
Congress had properly employed its power to “define and punish
offenses against the law of nations by sanctioning, within
constitutional limitations, the jurisdiction of military commissions to
try persons for offenses which, according to the rules and precepts of
the law of nations, and more particularly the law of war, are
cognizable by such tribunals.”125 The Court judged this delegation of
the Offenses Clause power not only by constitutional standards, but
in terms of the law of nations. The military commission’s trial was
deemed to be acceptable because it was held “according to the rules
and precepts of the law of nations.”126
In Yamashita, the Court affirmed the holding and reasoning of
Quirin. The Court considered the jurisdictional basis of American
military commissions charged with the trials of war criminals
abroad.127 Yamashita was a military commander charged with failing
to keep his troops from committing war crimes. The prosecution
argued that the alleged atrocities were so widespread that they must
have been either willfully permitted or secretly ordered.128 Yamashita
petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the military
commissions had no jurisdiction to try him.129
The Court rejected Yamashita’s claims and upheld the authority
of the military to try him. The Court considered the Articles of War,
which stated that “‘conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall
not be construed as depriving military commissions . . . of concurrent
jurisdiction in respect of offenders of offenses that by statute or by
the law of war may be triable by such military commissions . . . .’”130
The Court paused to assess the charges against Yamashita and noted
that “the allegations of the charge, tested by any reasonable standard,
adequately allege a violation of the law of war.”131 In both cases, the
123. See id. at 25-28.
124. See id. at 28.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
128. See id. at 13-14.
129. See id. at 5-6.
130. Id. at 7 (quoting Act of June 4, 1920, ch. 227, 41 Stat. 759, 790) (emphasis added).
131. Id. at 17.
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Court’s judgment of the constitutional issue was informed by its
understanding of the international law issue.
The Offenses Clause was not considered again by the Supreme
Court until Boos v. Barry.132 In Boos, the Court considered a statute
prohibiting the display of protest signs within five hundred feet of
foreign embassies in the United States.133 Before a thorough
discussion of the First Amendment issues, Justice O’Connor
summarily stated that the law was enacted pursuant to the Offenses
Clause.134 She elaborated that “the United States has a vital national
interest in complying with international law. The Constitution itself
tries to further this interest by expressly authorizing Congress ‘[t]o
define and punish . . . Offenses against the Laws of Nations.’”135
Although not necessarily inaccurate, the Court failed to critically
evaluate whether the Offenses Clause was intended to authorize such
statutes.136
While the preceding cases afford broad deference to
congressional actions under the Offenses Clause, that deference only
makes sense because there is another limitation. Congress need not
codify the elements of crimes against the law of nations because
those crimes are independently limited by the external
understandings of customary international law.137
CONCLUSION
Two trends have emerged in the last few decades regarding U.S.
lawmaking that concerns international law. First, the U.S.
132. 485 U.S. 312 (1988).
133. D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1115 (1981) (repealed 1988).
134. See Boos, 485 U.S. at 316 (“Congress enacted § 22-1115 in 1938 . . . pursuant to its
authority under Article I, § 8, cl. 10, of the Constitution to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses
against the Law of Nations.’”). The concurrence and the dissent also accepted without question
that Congress had authority to enact the statute pursuant to the Offenses Clause. See id. at 334
(Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 338 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and dissenting).
135. Id. at 323 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10).
136. Cf. Siegal, supra note 62, at 929 (“[D]espite the framers’ limited conception of the
offenses clause, the courts have given Congress broad discretion to define offenses against the
law of nations.”).
137. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942). Specifically, the Court stated:
Congress had the choice of crystallizing in permanent form and in minute detail
every offense against the law of war, or of adopting the system of common law
applied by military tribunals so far as it should be recognized and deemed applicable
by the courts. It chose the latter course.
Id.
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government has aggressively prosecuted aliens for crimes against
international law, such as torture and genocide, even when the crimes
did not involve the United States, and even when the prosecutions
themselves violated international law.138 Second, Congress has
enacted a wave of statutes that incorporate the law of nations into
federal criminal law.139 This spate of statutes criminalizing war crimes
has relied, in name at least, upon the Offenses Clause.140 Both trends
demonstrate an increasing desire for vigorous prosecution of any and
all violators of international law. But these efforts also demonstrate
an increasing disrespect for the sovereignty of other nations and,
therefore, an increasing disrespect for the jurisdictional rules of
international law.
The history, constitutional structure, and case law all indicate
that the Constitution requires that the reach of the Offenses Clause
be limited by the jurisdictional principles of customary international
law. This Note suggests that, to the extent that the Offenses Clause is
relied upon as the constitutional basis for these actions, disrespect for
international law also signals disrespect for constitutional law.
138. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that U.S.
jurisdiction extends to an alleged saboteur who was accused of activities in foreign airspace,
and who had no relation to the United States other than later being found within its borders).
139. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 175 (1994) (criminalizing biological weapons); id. § 470
(criminalizing extraterritorial counterfeiting); The Genocide Convention Implementation Act
of 1987 (the Proxmire Act), id. § 1091 (criminalizing genocide within the United States or by
Americans abroad); id. § 1203 (criminalizing the taking of hostages inside of or outside of the
United States); id. § 2332a (criminalizing the use of weapons of mass destruction); id. § 2332b
(Supp. III 1998) (criminalizing terrorism that transcends national borders); id. § 2332c (Supp.
III 1998) (criminalizing the use of chemical weapons); id. § 2332d (Supp. III 1998)
(criminalizing financial support or interactions with countries that support international
terrorism); id. § 2339A (criminalizing the act of providing support of terrorism); id. § 2339B
(Supp. III 1998) (criminalizing support of terrorist organizations); id. § 2340A (criminalizing
torture); The War Crimes Act of 1996, id. § 2441 (Supp. III 1998) (criminalizing war crimes by
or against Americans).
140. See statutes cited supra note 7; Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing International Law Home,
35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 665 n.211 (1998). The Clause has also been invoked as support for
congressional approval of the controversial International Criminal Court. See David Stoetling,
Status Report on the International Criminal Court, 3 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 233, 281
(1999) (arguing that “Congress has authority to ratify United States participation in the
International Criminal Court” based on the Offenses Clause, just as the Supreme Court relied
on the Clause in upholding the congressional choice of war crimes tribunals in Yamashita).
